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SECURITIZING INSURANCE RISKS

SECURITIZING INSURANCE RISKS
TAMAR FRANKEL & JOSEPH W. LAPLUME*

I.

INTRODUCTION
Innovations can consist of new lenses for viewing the state of the

world. Securitizing risks is such an innovation. The process of securitization
has been traditionally used as a method of converting illiquid financial assets
into liquid marketable assets. In the process, functions are unbundled, and
the risks of investors in these assets can be reduced by diversification and
other means.
However, the same process of securitization can be used to transfer
risks, whether represented by financial assets or attached to them. By this
method risks can be stripped and transferred, creating a derivative security
representing the amount and type of risk that investors in the markets are

ready to underwrite (for a price).'
*

Until recently, risk transfer was
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Ronald R. Lagueux, District Judge for the United States District Court of Rhode
Island. He is a graduate of Trinity College (B.A. 1995), University College London
(M.Phil. 1996) and Boston University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1999), where
he received the Edward F. Hennessey Distinguished Scholar Award. Following his
clerkship, he will begin practice as an associate in the Business and Finance section
in the Boston office of Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
The authors are indebted to Mr. Howard Altarescu, Vice President, Head of
Emerging Markets Structured Finance, Goldman Sachs, New York, for his
invaluable clarifications of the subject. Responsibility for the subject matter is, of
course, fully ours. Thanks to Mr. William Hecker for his technical checking of the
Article.
See Martha G. Bannerman, Avoiding and Resolving Reinsurance Coverage
1
Disputes: A ProactiveApproach, in REINSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE: NEW LEGAL
AND BUSINESS DEVELOPMENTS IN A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 1998, at
173, 203-04 (PLI) (noting developments of the insurance-based securities market
with 1998 sales of insurance-backed securities likely to surpass 1997 sales of $195
billion; describing recent issues; noting attention securities have received from the
investment community); Investors Guar. Fund, Ltd. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1523 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1998) (describing the emergence of
insurance risk securitization); Lawrence Richter Quinn, Weather Bonds from Enron,
Koch to Debut Today, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Nov. 1, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (describing the issuance of the first weather

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 19: 203

considered the sole domain of institutional intermediaries, especially
insurance companies. No longer. This function is becoming a joint domain of
institutions and the markets.
The process of insurance securitization follows traditional forms of
securitization. It consists of: (1) creating a "special purpose vehicle"(SPV),
and making the SPV as bankruptcy proof as possible; (2) causing the SPV to
issue bonds to investors; (3) causing the SPV to enter into reinsurance
contracts with ceding insurers or other beneficiaries for an annual payment
("premiums") and calculating the appropriate amount of premiums; (4)
investing the proceeds from the bond distribution and the premiums; (5)
ensuring the safety and soundness of the SPV and its investments; and (6)
servicing by reliable collection and distribution of the SPV's net earnings
and premiums payments (after paying the claims under the reinsurance
contracts, and management and other expenses).2
Since banks, insurance companies, and other financial intermediaries
hold mostly financial assets, risk securitization enables them to reduce their
portfolio risks in full or in part. They can continue to maintain client
relationships, hold the benefits from financial assets, and pay investors to
absorb the risks. If, for investors, the risks are lower than for the institutions,
investors may demand lower payments for underwriting the risks, and the
institutions, the investors or the insureds can pocket or share the difference.
Like most innovative ideas, securitization of insurance risks is simple; it
reflects insurance principles. After all, insurance consists of pooling risks
from a large number of those who are at risk and transferring-distributing
these risks among them (mutual insurance), or among a large number of
underwriters (insurance company shareholders). Securitization of insurance
does the same thing.
The new pooling, distribution, and transfer of risks can take two
forms. It can directly provide insurance to policyholders. Or it can constitute
an added and magnified layer over the traditional insurance, in which case
insurance and/or reinsurance ("insurance") remain intact, and a new system
of reinsurance is layered over it. SPV reinsurance contracts may absorb all or
specified parts of the ceding company's obligations, or can be limited to an
index of aggregate damages from a particular type of disaster.
Although the securitization of insurance risk is similar to the
traditional forms, it presents a number of significant innovative differences.
bonds, and noting that if the bonds are not called investors may make as much as
30% but the risk is high).
2
See generally 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 1 (1991) [hereinafter
FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION]. For a general description of the process, see Tamar
Frankel, Securitization, in FINANCIAL PRODUCTS FUNDAMENTALS ch. 4 (1999).
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First, if the transfer of the risks is from insurance companies, they remain
the secondary risk bearers. 3 Second, the new risk underwriters are investors,
and not other insurance companies. Third, the risks are transferred to
investors through the securities markets and the use of securitization 4
Fourth, because payment of claims is conditioned on payment of premiums,
investors' credit risks are far lower than their risks from mortgages or other
debt. Nonpayment of premiums automatically eliminates insurance
obligations. Fifth, because the premiums must cover investors' risks, the
calculation of the premiums is of great importance to the safety and
soundness of the SPV and investors' revenues. Such a risk, however, exists
also in pricing and valuation of loans in traditional securitization. But pricing
the bonds involves uncertainty.
The bonds issued by SPVs insurance securitization are unique.
Under these bonds payment of principal and/or return to investors depends
upon the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of an event or events, which the
SPV covers by direct obligations to insureds or obligations to insurance
companies under reinsurance contracts. Thus, if such events occur in a given
year, and payments on claims exceed the premiums or the proceeds on the
bonds (and returns on investment of these amounts) investors will lose. If,
however, under the SPV's obligations, payments due on claims are less than
the investments of the premiums and on the proceeds of the bonds, the bonds
5
will earn the difference.
Securitization of insurance is currently used to cover damages from
natural catastrophic events, such as earthquakes and floods ("catastrophic
events"). The investments involving risk coverage of such events are
attractive to investors because the risks do not correlate with business and
economic risks. The bonds offer diversification to the investments that most

3 Insurance companies may not transfer their obligations without the consent of
the policyholders, and we assume that such a consent is not forthcoming for practical
and other reasons.
4
See William D. Torchiana, Outline of Legal Issues For Insurers and Reinsurers
Considering Securitization of Insurance Risk, in NUTS & BOLTS OF FINANCIAL
PRODUCTS 1999: UNDERSTANDING THE EVOLVING WORLD OF CAPITAL MARKET &
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS 659, 661 (PLI).

5 Presumably, if the bonds are assessable, and payments due to policyholders
exceed the assets held by the SPVs, the bondholders will have to make up the
difference. Otherwise, bondholders will have a limited liability; that is, they may
lose their investments but not their homes.
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investors hold. However, this type of insurance is highly risky for insurers 6
The number of catastrophic events is relatively small, and their frequency is
hard to predict, while the damages from these events can be enormous.
Residents in parts of the country that do not experience such events are
unlikely to seek insurance. Price of insurance after the occurrence of a
catastrophic events usually rises and then falls when memory fades,
rendering the business of reinsurance volatile. The reinsurance industry does
not have sufficient capital to cover such risks. That is one reasons why the
U.S. government offers flood insurance in parts of the country. In effect,
substantial losses from natural disasters are transferred and distributed
8
among taxpayers.
The novel system of risk transfer addresses these problems by (1)
pooling a larger number of catastrophic events risks, and creating a more
diversified portfolio of such risks; (2) substituting investors (both individuals
and institutions that then distribute the risk to individuals) for insurers (and
risk taking taxpayers); (3) utilizing the mechanisms of the securities markets
to reach investors; and (4) in general, utilizing securitization techniques to
achieve these purposes, including manipulating the aggregate risks (e.g., by
institutional risk underwriters such as banks, other reinsurers). Through this
technique investors become insurers and reinsurers of catastrophic events.
Consequently, as compared to insurance risks covered by the capital of the
reinsurance industry, insurance risks through securitization are covered by
far larger and more liquid capital markets? However, even though insurance
securitization may relieve the insurance industry by providing it with added

Steve Tuckey, Regulator Sess [sic] CatastropheBonds as the Answer, ASSET
SALES REP., Oct. 25, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (citing
Arnold Dutcher, chief deputy director of the Illinois Insurance Department, that
based on predictions "had the storm Andrew gone ashore about 40 miles north...
about 36% of the carriers covering the losses would have been made insolvent...
leading to an exhaustion of state guaranty funds and up to $54 billion in unpaid
claims").
7 See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 400 1(a) (1994).
8 See generally Charles T. Griffith, The National Flood Insurance Program:
UnattainedPurposes, Liability in Contract and Takings, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
727 (1994).
9
See Eduardo Canabarro et al. Goldman Sachs and Richard R Anderson et al.,
Risk Management Solutions, Analyzing Insurance-LinkedSecurities, Oct. 1998 , at
.1-4 [hereinafter: Goldman Sachs]; Ruth Gastel, Reinsurance, III INS. ISSUES
UPDATE, Jan. 2000, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (describing
insurance risk securitization).
6
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capital, commentators are concerned that insurance risk 0securitization may
also pose a competitive threat to the reinsurance industry.'
Each of the steps in the securitization process raises legal issues.
Many of these issues are being resolved by the markets or by new laws.
Insurance securitization poses added unique issues at most stages of the
securitization process. Underlying these issues is the difficulty of classifying
insurance risk securitization as insurance or securities or futures contracts.
The questions apply both to the SPVs and the bonds they issue. Since the
legal system addresses insurance, securities, and futures contracts separately,
whenever the assets represent combined features, similar problems arise. 1
The classification of insurance risk securitization determines the regulation
of their operations, taxation, sales, and creditors' rights in the event of
bankruptcy.
Legal problems, and especially the applicability of insurance
regulation, have triggered the escape of insurance securitization offshore,
where institutions such as banks, that are not regulated by insurance laws, are
developing a thriving business. That concerned the insurance industry and its
regulators. Competitors to the reinsurance companies are relieved from
regulation and expanding a lucrative business. Regulators of other
institutions are gaining at the expense of insurance regulators. The insurance
industry and its regulators have taken steps'to resolve the legal issues and
invite insurance securitization back on shore. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") has adopted a Model Law and is
currently considering another. 12 A number of states have passed laws
10

See Steve Tuckey, Outlook Negativefor Reinsurance Market, INS. ACCT., Sept.

13, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File; Standard & Poor's
Outlook Negative for Global Reinsurance Industry, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 7, 1999,

available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (noting that reinsurers are
packaging and purchasing insurance-linked bonds); Mark P. Gergen, Afterword.
Apocalypse Not?, 50 TAX L. REV. 833, 843 (1995) ("[S]ecuritization of reinsurance
risks seems inevitable given the current tribulations of the reinsurance market."). A
similar concern was posed by the banking industry. However, rather than fight it, the
banks joined it. It seems that a similar attitude is adopted by the insurance industry.
I1 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Variable Annuities, Variable Insurance and Separate

Accounts, 51 B.U. L. REV. 173, 177-219 (1971) (discussing the structure and legal
classification of variable annuities and variable life insurance and the status of
separate accounts under the securities acts).
12 See Protected Cell Company Model Law (visited Jan. 25, 2000)
<http://www.naic.org/lpapers/models/1299docs/protected-cellcompany_
model_law.htm>; NAIC Adopts Catastrophe Bond Protected-Cell Model,
BESTWIRE, Dec. 7, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting
that the Model Law is similar to an Illinois act); NAIC Addresses Reinsurance
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addressing some of the issues.1 3 The legal adjustments required to
accommodate insurance securitization are not yet complete.
The method of risk transfer by securitization is especially important
for insurers and reinsurers engaged in the business of risk underwriting, and4
could drastically change insurance concepts and the insurance industry.'
The method can also have an effect on policyholders and taxpayers. A
similar process, however, may be used for securitizing risks of other
financial assets, including bank assets, and it seems that experts are at work
to design risk transfers in that area as well. Because it is a prototype for
future risk securitization, this Article focuses on securitizing insurance risks.
This Article analyzes and evaluates the legal problems that have
arisen in connection with this rapidly developing insurance risk
securitization. The first part of the Article deals with legal issues concerning
the SPVs that undertake insurance and reinsurance contracts with ceding
insurers and the other parties to the transaction. The Article addresses the
dilemma in choosing the laws applicable to SPVs, the bonds they issue, and
the persons and entities that form part of the securitization transaction. These
laws involve state insurance laws, bankruptcy and tax laws, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and the Commodity Exchange Act of 1934, the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. All these
laws treat insurance and securities differently, and do not comfortably fit
both. In addition, the insurance/securities distinction may require a choice
between state and federal laws. Further muddying the waters is the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which gives priority in some cases to state
insurance laws.
Recent developments in the financial markets have posed similar
problems of classification, and attempts have been made to accommodate
arrangements that bear the features of more than one "pure" financial asset
species. One form of analysis focuses on whether the financial asset
resembles one type or another. However, there is no escape from determining
what "resemble" means, and that leads to a policy inquiry about the problems
which the legislation was designed to reduce or eliminate, and to the policies
underlying the chosen solutions. This Article has adopted this approach.
Part II of the Article examines the proposed solutions that the
insurance industry and its regulators have offered to the legal problems
Regulatory Issues at Winter National Meeting, INT'L REINSURANCE DiSP. REP., Dec.

27, 1999, at 9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
13 See, e.g., sources cited infra note 54 (Rhode Island and Illinois laws).
14 See Simon Challis, The Compelling Maths of Insurance Bonds, EUROWEEK,
Sept. 4, 1998 (visited Jan. 22, 2000) <http://www.risconsulting.com/ News/090498

(2).htm>.
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involving insurance securitization, and unresolved issues that are still
pending. The Article concludes with a proposed guide to addressing the
issues.
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING THE SPVS

H.
A.

The Relationship Between State and Federal Laws: The
McCarran-Ferguson Act

The relationship between federal and state insurance laws is
governed by a special statute that gives precedence to state laws. Under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act1 5 the "business of insurance" is to be governed by
state laws, unless federal laws expressly apply to insurance business.1 6 If a
state adopts a clear law applicable to insurance securitization, and classifies
17
it as the business of insurance, federal courts might concede jurisdiction,
although in some cases they did not (for example,18 in the case of variable
annuities and mergers among insurance companies).
In Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, the Supreme Court
set forth three criteria relevant in determining whether a
particular practice is part of the "business of insurance" ...
first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice
is an integral part of the policy relationship between the

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
For a discussion of what constitutes the "business of insurance" see, e.g., Group
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724 (1985); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
17 See In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 441 (7" Cir. 1993) (stating
that "when Congress has not provided an explicit alternative to state law, we are
mindful that the Bankruptcy Code was written in the shadow of state law and
conclude that Congress intended state law to fill the interstices"); see also Butner v.
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979); In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1373-74 (3d Cir.
1987).
18 See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable
annuities are subject to the Securities Act of 1933); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393
U.S. 453 (1969) (mergers among insurance companies may be subject to securities
regulation); 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS § 12, at
44-49 (1978) [hereinafter FRANKEL, MONEY MANAGERS].
15

16
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insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry. 9
Although many states use the criteria outlined above in defining the
"business of insurance," under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, each state has
the authority to define the term differently. In all likelihood, the SPVs will
fall within states' statutory definition of the "business of insurance," thus
subjecting SPVs to the particular state's insurance regulations.2
Consequently, state insurance laws will have priority over general federal
laws that do not specifically target insurance companies.
B.

Bankruptcy Issues: Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)

One of the main concerns of investors in traditional securitized
assets is that the assets they bought indirectly, and held by the SPV, will be
vulnerable to the claims of the transferors' creditors. The claims can be based
on the ground that the transfer was faulty 2 ' or that the SPV is not separate
from the bankrupt transferor and should be consolidated with the transferor.
Thereafter, its assets would be distributed among the transferor's creditors.
In insurance securitization, however, the assets that investors may
lose to the creditors of the ceding insurance company are the premiums due
to the SPV under reinsurance contracts. The SPV's other assets derive from
the bondholders' payments. In contrast to the traditional process, in
insurance securitization the shoe is on the other foot. As to premiums, the
SPV is the obligor. If premiums remain unpaid, no claims will be paid either.
The policies are canceled before the covered period. Under this scenario
investors will not stand in line with other creditors of the ceding company,
and they need not perfect a security interest in the assets of the insurance
22
company.
In traditional securitization SPVs are allowed to engage in few
activities, usually just holding and servicing the assets. Therefore, the SPVs
themselves are unlikely to become bankrupt. In contrast, insurance
securitization involves more management and business decisions. For
example, the risk involved in calculating the premiums, though it may be
19
20

Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 458 U.S. at 129.
To avoid such regulation, SPVs were established and operated offshore in

Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. See Alex Maurice, NAIC Poised to Adopt
Securitization Models, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS
MGMT., EDITION, July 12, 1999, at S28, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curws
File; Jeany Haggerty, US. Regulators to Bust Open Insurer Securitization,
DERIVATIVES WK., Aug. 16, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 11307225.
21 See 1 FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 2, § 10.10.
22

See id. § 10.8.
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complex, is low if made by experts of a regulated financial institution, such
as a bank. Risk may, however, rise if the SPV is not managed by a reliable
institution. Further, the pricing of the bonds is difficult. In such a case
sponsors of securitization must make every effort to render the SPV
"bankruptcy remote" or even "bankruptcy proof." They should ensure the
SPV's independence.
Under bankruptcy laws, the status of insurance risk securitization is
complex. It seems, however, that the SPVs are subject to insurance laws
rather than to the Federal Bankruptcy Code. One reason is the McCarranFerguson Act, described above. Since SPVs carry insurance obligations
federal courts might view them as insurance companies, subject to the
regulation of insurance state laws.
In addition, federal courts may determine SPVs' status as insurance
companies under the federal bankruptcy code. Section 109(b)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides that a "domestic insurance company" is not
eligible to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. 3 The Code, however,
does not define the term "domestic insurance company." Federal courts have
interpreted the term "domestic insurance company" under a number of
approaches. One approach relies solely on state insurance laws to define the
term .24 Under this approach, an entity could be excluded under the state law
if either "state law classifies the entity as... specifically excluded.., under
section 109(b)(2)," or if state law did not specifically exclude the entity at
issue, then "the question becomes whether the entity is the substantial
25
equivalent of those in the excluded class."
A second approach relies on the courts' independent classification,
presumably applying a federal common law analysis. 6 Under this approach,
a reviewing court would look only to the language and legislative history of
section 109(b)(2) and make a determination using traditional techniques of
statutory construction. 27 A third approach examines the policy question
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1994).
24 See, e.g, In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 548-52 (7th Cir.)
(holding, under both the state classification test and the independent classification
test, that a currency exchange was not an excluded entity under section 109(b)(2))
(applying Illinois law), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 904 (1985); In re Michigan Master
Health Plan, Inc., 90 B.R. 274 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (relying solely on the opinion of
the Michigan Attorney General that an HMO was not an insurance company), revg
44 B.R. 642 (Bankr., E.D. Mich. 1984) (finding HMO to be insurance company
under both the state and independent tests).
25 In re Cash Currency Exchange, lnc., 762 F.2d at 548.
26 See id. at 551-52.
23

27

See id.
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whether federal bankruptcy relief would be a satisfactory alternative to the
state proceedings; 2 8 and a fourth approach follows the classification under
the law of the SPV's state of incorporation, so long as that classification does
not frustrate the policies of the Bankruptcy Code 29
As it relates to insurance securitization, the key test in all these
approaches appears to be whether the state classifies and treats the SPV as an
insurance company. Thus, the Seventh Circuit stated: "The essential
attribute of an insurance company under Illinois law, and the attribute
prompting deference to state regulation, is the assumption [by the company
in question] of a third party's risk for a premium.'3 0 Following the Seventh
Circuit's approach, the status as a "domestic insurance company" of an SPV
that enters into reinsurance contracts with a currently insolvent primary
insurance company is likely to be determined under state law rather than the
federal bankruptcy law. Having underwritten the insurance companies'
obligations, the SPVs step into the insurance companies' shoes for
bankruptcy purposes. 3 1 In addition, since the insurance companies remain
liable under the insurance policies, and perhaps also the reinsurance contract,
it is inefficient to manage different debtors of the same debt in different
courts under different laws.
There are policy arguments against splitting laws and jurisdiction
over bankruptcy issues involving SPVs among the various state laws and
courts. Unlike insurance companies that are likely to be anchored in one
state, investors in catastrophic events bonds can be located all over the
world. For them, uniformity of the law and jurisdiction are very important.
The applicability of state laws may reduce the price of these bonds to
compensate investors for the legal uncertainty relating to the SPV that issued
the bonds. On the other hand, if state law and jurisdiction give bondholders
greater protection than federal law, investors might forego the inconvenience
of lack of uniformity and prefer state laws. Forum shopping, however, is not
desirable. Therefore, whatever the outcome, it seems that the states should
strive to provide bankruptcy rules governing SPVs that are uniform and
predictable.
See In re Republic Trust & Sav. Co., 59 B.R. 606, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.1986).
See In re Estate of Medicare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 440-42 (7th Cir. 1993)
(determining that an HMO was a "domestic insurance company" under the
Bankruptcy Code and thus excluded from federal Bankruptcy Code relief) (citing
Security Bldg. & Loan v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 678 (1933)).
30 Id at 445.
31 See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5817.
28
29
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The Applicability of State Insurance Laws Regulation to
SPVs and Persons Involved

Insurance risk securitization and its SPVs pose regulatory issues.
SPVs, in whatever legal form, that issue catastrophic event bonds may fall
within the state law definition of an insurance company or a reinsurance
company.3 2 SPVs fall within the definition if they issue reinsurance
obligations. However, if they merely buy insurance or reinsurance policies,
they become the insureds rather than the insurers. The bondholders are
arguably insurers because their payoffs are tied to the insurance risk, and
because they finance the direct insurer. Arguably, the parties that finance
insurance risks, and the insurance risk securitization, even in an
unconventional way through the capital markets by using securitization
techniques, may be subjected to insurance regulation.
This quagmire of analysis can not be clarified by asking whether
these activities constitute insurance. These activities have no analog. Rather,
the question should be: what are the problems that insurance statutes are
designed to solve? Does insurance securitization or any part of the process
pose the same problems? A number of structures and scenarios may lead to
the answer.
If SPVs underwrite insurance risks by undertaking to pay
policyholders upon the occupancy of catastrophic events, then the SPVs
seem to pose the same problems as any insurance company does. The SPVs
may not have sufficient assets to cover the losses under the policies because
they would distribute funds to the holders of the securities that they issue
without keeping sufficient funds for reserves, or because they invest the
reserves in speculative investments. These were some of the problems that
led to the passage of state laws. These were the problems that led to the
mutualization of insurance companies, since the managements of the
companies at that time were more concerned with the safety and soundness
of the companies (and the longevity of the managements' positions) than the
controlling shareholders, who desired to spend, or speculate in, the reserves.
Thus, SPVs that have undertaken to cover catastrophic events by collecting
policyholders' premiums directly or through the ceding company should be
subject to the reserve and prudent investment requirements of state insurance
laws. If, however, the main insurers remain regulated insurance companies,
and if they abide by the laws and transfer to the SPVs only the appropriate
amounts of dividends, then perhaps SPVs need not be subject to these laws.
32 See Michael P. Goldman et al., Legal and Regulatory Issues Affecting Insurance
Derivatives and Securitization, in SWAPS & OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1999, at 433,

441 (PLI).
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Instead, they and their shareholders could be viewed as financiers of insurers,
even if they underwrite some of the insurance risks and participate in the
insurers' profits.
A similar analysis applies to the other parties to the securitization
transaction, including the promoters, purchasers, owners, or writers of
insurance securitization products. If they are "conducting an insurance
33
business," they will be subject to insurance regulation, including licensing.
If they arrange for financing insurers and nothing else, they should not be
subject to insurance regulation. The promoters of insurance securitization
may be analogized to the promoters of an insurance company, that is, the
SPV. However, if they do not continue to manage the SPV they may also be
free of regulation. The salespersons of the bonds are unlikely to be
characterized as insurance salespersons if the bonds are not insurance
contracts. However, to the extent that the SPVs are deemed to be engaged in
the insurance business and state insurance laws expressly apply to them, they
will be regulated under these laws.
This conclusion does not end the inquiry, however. The next
question is whether the SPVs and the issuance and sale of the bonds are
subject to the securities acts.
Insurance v. Securities

D.

SPVs and catastrophic event bonds that they issue may be subject to
the securities acts. If both the assets that the SPVs hold and the bonds that
they issue are securities, they will fall within the definition of an investment
company. If the bonds they issue are securities, they will be subject to the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
1.

Are the Bonds Issued by SPVs Insurance Obligations?

Arguably, the bonds are insurance obligations because they cover all
or part of the damages caused by catastrophic events, and receive
compensation for underwriting such risks. In fact, the bondholders indirectly
pay the policyholders all or part of the proceeds under their policies if such
events occur. However, the bondholders do not underwrite the risks and do
not undertake to pay policyholders directly. They do so through the SPV, and
most likely through the insurance or reinsurance companies. In that respect
the bonds are similar to financiers of the insurer or, better still, its partners.
Presumably, investors have no control over the SPVs investment decisions
and business practices. Therefore, even though the bonds are linked to
underwriting of insurance, their holders are not engaged in the insurance
business and are not insurers. The key difference would seem to be control.
33

See id. at 446.
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To the extent that the bondholders do not control, they are not insurers. On
the insurance side, insurance commissions should issue interpretative
statements exempting the parties to insurance securitization transactions
34
from licensing requirements. It is likely that most, but not necessarily all,
36
35
state insurance commissioners do so and issue such exemptions. The
proposed Model Act described below would exclude the bonds from the
definition of "insurance contract," and thus would make it clear that federal
law applies to the SPV issuers of catastrophic events bonds. This does not
mean that insurance companies engaged in insurance risk securitization will
not be regulated by the states if they are permitted to engage in that activity
which will then be classified as "insurance business."
2.

Are the Bonds Issued by the SPVs Securities?

The bonds also may fall within the definition of a "security" in the
securities acts, 37 under the rubric of investment contracts. The bonds meet

For example, the New York-based Catastrophe Risk Exchange (CATEX),
established in 1996 to promote trading in property and casualty insurance risks, was
licensed by the New York Insurance Department as a reinsurance intermediary. See
Susanne Sclafane, Insurers Can Soon Swap CAT Exposure, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, July 31, 1995, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that department licensed
CATEX as "neutral" reinsurance intermediary, with "no contractual affiliation to
negotiate for either side of a risk-swapping transaction").
35 See Torchiana, supra note 4, at 671 (noting that "all but a limited number of
state insurance authorities have issued written interpretations or other indications"
exempting the parties).
36 Of course, even if such exemptions are granted by state insurance
commissioners, these determinations will not be binding on a reviewing court.
37 Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines a "security" as any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateraltrust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or
index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof),
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (Supp. III 1997).
34
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most of the elements of the SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.3 8 test, since the
investors part with their money that is invested in a common enterprise (the
SPV) with the expectation of receiving profits from the efforts of others. This
last factor may be debatable. That is because the efforts of others have
occurred before the bonds were distributed to the public.
Although they may have insurance features, catastrophic event bonds
are distinguished from "pure" insurance contracts. In fact, these bonds are
akin to variable insurance contracts (variable annuities and variable life
insurance). 39 They are securities with insurance features, subject to the
securities acts and to some insurance regulation as well.
In that respect the bonds are similar to participations in "viatical
settlements," which the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia held to be
neither insurance not securities. The court held that securitized life insurance
policies are not securities because the promoters performed their efforts
before the sale of participations in the policies. 40 The Securities and
Exchange Commission, however, is of the opinion that these participations
are securities. The jury is still out on the issue. If the catastrophic events
bonds are securities, they are subject to the Securities Act of 1933. The SPV
and any sales and secondary trading in the bonds will be regulated by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ensuring investors of information and
regulated secondary markets in the bonds.
3.

Investment Companies v. Insurance Companies

The Securities and Exchange Commission viewed traditional SPVs
that hold illiquid financial assets (e.g., mortgage loans) as holders of
securities and issuers of securities. These elements subjected SPVs to the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (the 1940 Act). The 1940 Act has three
separate definitions of an investment company, two of which are important.
One defines an investment company as an issuer (of securities) that holds
itself out or proposes to be primarily engaged in investing and trading in
securities. The second definition is an issuer (of securities) of more than 40%
of the net value of its assets is invested or held in "investment securities."
Investment securities are all securities except government securities and
securities of majority-held subsidiaries.
Assuming that SPVs' bonds are securities, SPVs will not be
categorized as investment companies unless they also invest or trade or hold

328 U.S. 293 (1946).
See Frankel, supra note 11, at 173.
40 See SEC v. Life Partners, Inc., 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 102 F.3d
587 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
38
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securities. 4 1 If the SPVs do not hold policies but only invest the proceeds of
the bonds they issued and the premiums they collect in securities, then their
portfolios consist of securities. If the SPVs hold insurance obligations of
others, those might not be securities. The Securities Act of 1933 exempts
insurance policies from registration, rather than from the definition of the
Act. 42 The 1940 Act regulates "face-amount certificate companies" that issue
annuities, which would have been included in the definition of insurance
products.43 Nonetheless, it was long believed that policies are not securities,
and that the exemption from registration was simply an over-precautionary
measure by Congress.
SPVs are likely to fall within the definition of investment companies
if more than 40% of their assets (reserves) consist of investment securities.
If the bonds they issue are deemed securities, then these SPVs will fall
within the definition of an investment company.
For traditional securitization this issue is resolved. At the outset, it
was obvious that no securitization can take place if SPVs must conform with
the Act. Hence, the Commission exempted SPVs from the definition of an
investment company, and as a result from the provisions of the 1940 Act,
subject to a number of important conditions, listed in Rule 3a-7 under the
44
Act.
For SPVs of risk securitization there is another avenue of escaping
the 1940 Act. If SPVs are deemed insurance companies subject to regulation
under state laws, then they are excepted from the definition of an investment
company under section 3(c)(1) of the 1940 Act. Although the proposed
Model Act would exclude the bonds issued by the SPVs from the definition
of an investment contract, if the Model Act regulates the SPV in other ways,
the SPV may be excluded from the definition of an investment company as
an insurance company. Barring such state regulation, however, the better
argument seems to be that SPVs are investment companies, unless an
exemption or rule 3a-7 applies to them.
The rule requires SPVs to hold static portfolios and does not permit
trading in the portfolios. SPVs issuing catastrophic events bonds are in a
somewhat different position. If they engage in active trading in their

41 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1) (A), (C) (Supp. III 1997).
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (1994). Even as "supererogation" as Professor Louis
Loss suggested. See 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION

1072-74 (3d ed. 1999); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 n.30 (1967) (citing
an earlier edition of the treatise).
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1) (B) (Supp. III 1997).
44 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (1999).
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investment, and if their portfolio does not conform to the conditions of the
rule,45 they may have to seek a special exemption from the SEC.
E.

Tax Issues: Pass-Through Treatment and Deductibility of
Payments

Securitization, like other institutional intermediation, involves a
number of similar tax issues, regardless of the financial assets that are being
securitized. The first issue relates to pass-through tax treatment for SPVs. A
double taxation, first of the returns to the SPV and then on the distributed
income to investors, would render insurance securitization impractical. This
problem was solved by Congress for securitization of mortgages by passing
REMICs. 46 Congress also resolved the issue for securitization of other
financial assets, such as receivables.4 7 SPVs do not fit comfortably within
either statute. The problem of double taxation can be solved, at least in part,
if catastrophic event bonds are viewed as debt for tax purposes. In such a
case, SPVs can deduct from the income they receive through investments
and premiums the payments they make to investors (as return on debt).
This is a partial solution if the SPV must keep reserves which cannot
be distributed. The returns on these reserves cannot be deducted from the
SPV's income tax bill. However, even assuming that the reserves can be
deducted, the status of the bonds as debt and the payments on the bonds as
interest is not free from doubt. The payments on the bonds are not related to
the face amount of the bonds, as interest payments would be, but are linked
to the occurrence of certain events. If the bonds are not deemed to be debt,
the payments on the bonds cannot be deducted from the SPV's income.
Double taxation will rear its ugly head.
SPVs could be organized as grantor trusts and other organizational
forms that allow pass-through tax treatment. However, each of these forms
poses problems and would render insurance risk securitization less
advantageous as compared to other investments.
It seems that such SPVs invest the proceeds of the bonds in debt instruments
tied to a LIBOR measure, which would be of low risk. Their investments of annual
premiums may be more aggressive, but not necessarily equity.
46 See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 671, §§ 860A-860G,
100 Stat. 2085, 2308-18 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G (1994 &
Supp. III 1997)).
47 See 1 FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION, supra note 2, §§ 8.15.1, 8.15A.1. In August
1996, Congress passed the Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT)
as part of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-188,
sec.1621(a), §§ 860H-860L, 110 Stat. 1755, 1858-66 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 860H-860L (Supp. III 1997)).
45
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The Status of SPVs and the Bonds They Issue Under The
Commodity Exchange Act of 1934

The Commodity Exchange Act of 1934 ("CEA") regulates a "futures
contract" or a "commodity option," which it defines as a security in which
principal and or interest payments are dependent on changes in the value of a
commodity.4 8 The definition of a commodity is broad, and includes financial
instruments and intangibles such as interest rates and indexes. Consequently,
there is a question whether the sale of bonds, which provide for payments
based on an index (combined damages from possible events), is regulated
under the CEA.
Arguably the bonds are not included in the definition and escape the
regulation of the Act. This result, however, is unlikely. All instruments,
including all Chicago Board of Trade insurance options and over-the-counter
insurance derivatives, defined as "futures contracts" will be subject to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") regulation and the
CEA's exchange-trading requirement 9
Alternatively, narrow exemptions in the CFTC's rules may cover
securities issued by the SPV.50 One possibility is that these transactions will
fall under the "Shad-Johnson Accord," which vested in the SEC jurisdiction

48 Section la(3) of the Commodity Exchange Act defines the term commodity as
"all... goods and articles... and all services, rights and interests in which contracts
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in." 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (1994). It
should be noted that this term is defined broadly.
49 With limited exceptions, all individuals and organizations that intend to do
business as futures professionals are required to be registered with the CFTC and to
become members of the National Futures Association. Consequently, the categories
of industry professionals subject to the CFTC's registration requirement include
most parties to futures transactions, including but not limited to futures commission
merchants, brokers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, floor
brokers and floor traders.
50 See, for example, the CEA's cash forward contracts under section Ia(1 1) of the
CEA, 7 U.S.C. § la(1 1) (1994), may apply; the CFTC's Statutory Interpretation
Concerning Forward Transactions (September 25, 1990); the "Treasury
Amendment" relating to transactions in foreign currency and other instruments such
as security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase
options, government securities, or mortgage and mortgage purchase commitments
not traded on an exchange (Section 2(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii)
(1994)); a limited exception from the exchange-trading requirement for "trade
options" (CFTC Regulation 32.4(a), 7 U.S.C. § 32.4(a) (1999)).

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 19: 203

over options on securities. 5 1 The Shad-Johnson Accord divides jurisdiction
between the CFTC and the SEC with respect to futures, securities, and
options. The CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over futures contracts with
respect to groups or indices of securities and options on such futures
contracts while the SEC has exclusive jurisdiction over securities and options
on securities. However, under the Shad-Johnson Accord, if a product creates
both a "security" and a "contract for future delivery," the CFTC has
exclusive jurisdiction. 52 Also, the CFTC has exemptive authority 53 which
authorizes the CFTC to exempt from any provision of the CEA any
agreement, contract, or transaction that is otherwise subject to the exchangetrading requirement, if the CFTC determines that the exemption is consistent
with the public interest. The SPV's bonds may merit such an exemption
because they are not the type of obligations for which Congress designed the
CEA.
HI.

SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS
A.

The Cell Structure

To attract insurance risk securitization business, states such as Rhode
Island and Illinois passed comprehensive legislation ("Protected Cell Acts")
this past year aimed at promoting insurance securitization onshore. 4 These
Acts offer not only reduced burdens on SPVs but marketing advantages to
SPV sponsors. In December 1999, the NAIC adopted a Protected Cell
Company Model Law, similar to the Illinois act. 5
The Protected Cell Acts passed in Rhode Island and Illinois allow
insurers to tap the capital markets directly by selling catastrophic event

51 See section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i) (1994), and section 9(g) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(g) (1994) (collectively, the
"Shad-Johnson Accord").
52 See CME v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 1989).
53 See Section 4(c)(1) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 6(c) (1994).
54 See Protected Cell Companies Act, 1999 R.I. PUB. LAWS ch. 22 (to be codified
at R.I. GEN. LAWS, §§ 27-64-1 to 27-64-12); Protected Cell Company Law, 1999
ILL. LAWS 278 (1999) (codified at ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/107.06a, /179A-1 to
-40 (West Supp. 1999)).
55

See

Protected Cell Company Model Law

(visited

Jan.

25,

2000)

<http://www.naic.org/l papers/models/1299docs/protected cell companymodel la
w.htm>; NAIC Adopts CatastropheBond Protected-Cell Model, BESTWIRE, Dec. 7,

1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (noting that Model Law is
similar to the Illinois act).

2000]

SECURITIZING INSURANCE RISKS

bonds using a Protected Cell within the insurance company.5 6 Protected Cells
offer a number of advantages. First, a Protected Cell would retain the
accounting advantages offered to insurers. Second, the Cell would protect
investors from any liabilities incurred by the insurance company of which it
is a part.
Third, under the Rhode Island and Illinois laws, the Cell's assets are
separate from those of the insurance company. Therefore, a domestic insurer
can protect the assets in the Cell from its own creditors or its receiver, should
the insurer become insolvent. For investors, the new laws' features offer a
number of advantages. Investors seem to have their cake and eat it. The
Cell's assets are part of the insurance company's assets. Therefore, they are
not subject to state or federal bankruptcy acts, but rather to state laws
regulating insurance companies' insolvency. Moreover, if the host insurance
companies become insolvent, policyholders (including the bondholders) can
resort to state funds that support insurance companies' obligations.
Additionally, the law relieves the insurance company issuing
catastrophic event bonds of the need to show a "true sale" of assets to an
SPV that would normally issues the bonds. These assets include insurance
policies, if any, and cash and investments that are due from the insurance
company to an SPV. Thus, the Protected Cell solves the difficulty of
rendering an SPV "bankruptcy remote." Finally, the Protected Cell is likely
to solve the problem of double taxation. Absent an SPV there is no entity to
be tax from the insurance company.
Arguably, the Protected Cell is specially designed for insurance
securitization, and is more efficient than the traditional SPVs that are
currently situated offshore. The offshore SPVs involve administrative and
office costs while the Protected Cell is held domestically, and is created
within a domestic insurance company involving no additional administrative
costs.
A number of issues remain. The Protected Cell structure within a
U.S. domiciled reinsurer raises an accounting question of whether the ceding
insurer could take credit for the transaction using reinsurance 7 or hedge

In addition, insurers may sell to investors exchange traded futures and options,
and over-the-counter traded options and swaps, by using a Protected Cell.
56

57

See ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING FOR REINSURANCE OF SHORT-DURATION AND

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
113, § 33 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 1992); NAIC Accounting Practices
and Procedures, ch. 22.
LONG-DURATION CONTRACTS,
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accounting. 58 In the 1980s, the NAIC changed the accounting rules for
ceded reinsurance. 59 If reinsurance accounting is followed, FASB 113
requires that prepaid insurance premiums and reinsurance receivables be
reported as assets, while it recognized estimated reinsurance receivables in a
manner consistent with the liabilities relating to the underlying reinsured
Thus, the precise accounting treatment for insurance
contracts. 60
securitization must be resolved in all 50 states before these transactions can
61
come onshore.
Presumably, the treatment of a Protected Cell under these Protected
Cell Acts would be analogous to the treatment of a separate account used by
a life insurer. That may reduce tax-related problems with federal and state
authorities. 62 Whether the Cells are investment companies remains to be
seen. They may follow the model of separate accounts, or be excluded from
the definition of the Act under rule 3a-7. Arguably, the bonds issued by the
insurance company will be subject to the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, perhaps with future exemptions as to sales
load limitations. In sum, Cells constitute bondholders as secured creditors to
the insurance companies, avoiding bankruptcy, tax, and regulatory problems
that arise when SPVs are viewed as separate entities. Of course, the Cell
Acts subject Cells to safety and soundness of insurance regulation and to
prudence requirements for reserves.
The Cell Acts allow insurance companies to set aside certain assets
and subject them to the bondholders' priority claims. These holders will then
have a first claim on the assets, and perhaps on reserves supporting the
obligations, as secured creditors do. However, the claims will not be subject
to the Uniform Commercial Code requirements, or to burdens usually
designed to protect the creditors of the transferor of the financial assets to the
58 See Gregory May, Taxing Derivative FinancialInstruments, in TAX STRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,

DISPOSITIONS,

SPIN-OFFS,

JOINT

VENTURES,

FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 1999, at 601, 610 (PLI).

59 See Reinsurance Intermediary Model Act (NAIC 1993).
60 SeeFASB 113, supranote 57, § 14.
61 A complete discussion of the accounting issues regarding insurance
securitization is beyond the scope of this article. For a more detailed discussion of
reinsurance accounting, see Subcomm. on Ann. Rev. of the Fed. Regulation of Sec.
Comm. of the Am. Bar Ass'n,

Significant 1993 Legislative and Regulatory

Developments, 49 BUS. LAW. 948, 983-84 (1994). See NAIC Delays Catastrophe
Reserve Action, INS. ACCT., June 14, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS, Market
Library, ABBB File.
62 See generally Gerald Kaplan et al., Taxation Of Insurance Companies: Annual
Survey, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 402 (1991).
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SPVs. Instead, state insurance commissions would determine the priorities
due to the bondholders under the terms of the bonds and the Acts.
The main problem of Cells, however, seems to be a business
problem for insurance companies. The cell structure creates a preferred class
of bondholders at the expense of other policyholders. If policyholders
constitute the bulk of the insurance companies' business, the priority may not
help their business. Further, the structure is unique and new. It goes beyond
what insurance companies were allowed to do in the past. Insurance
companies were allowed to offer segregated assets to policyholders as
security, but in most cases the insurance companies did not guarantee
payments from their general accounts.6 3 In the Protected Cell case they will.
The question is whether insurance companies will take advantage of the
structure at the risk of losing other insurance business.
B.

The NAIC Model Act

A second solution to the insurance risk securitization is the Special
Purpose Reinsurance Vehicle Model Act of the Insurance Securitization
Working Group of the NAIC, an Act designed to facilitate the issuance of
catastrophic event bonds. 64 The Model Act's structure differs from that of
the Illinois and Rhode Island acts. As of December 1999 the Model Act is
"still a work in progress." 6 5
Unlike the Cell structure, in the Model Act, the SPV is established as
a separate entity (SPRV). One reason for a separate SPRV is to capitalize on
the investors' familiarity with the structure. This structure is also doctrinally
clearer, and politically more feasible. The choice of insurance state laws will
bring predictability. But there is no free lunch. The choice of state laws will
66
bring forum shopping as well.
Pro forma, insurance companies have segregated assets as separate accounts that
funded variable insurance products, but guaranteed only the insurance component of
the securities issued by these accounts. See Travelers Ins. Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1006 (Aug. 6, 1990) (stating that insurance
regulators required full funding of the insurance obligations, and that the investment
risks and benefits are transferred to the contract holders.); I FRANKEL, MONEY
MANAGERS, supra note 18, § 18.
64 See NAIC Addresses Reinsurance Regulatory Issues at Winter National
63

Meeting, INT'L REINSURANCE DISP. REP., Dec. 27, 1999, at 9, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Cumws File.

65 See id.
66 See sources cited supra note 54. We believe that, in addition to addressing the

bankruptcy issue, state laws should explicitly state that the assets of the SPV are
separate from the primary insurance company. Whether federal courts will accept
this statement or require proof of independence is an open question. Such a
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The Model Act states that catastrophic event bonds are not insurance
contracts. The Act does allow insurance companies to engage in issuing such
bonds through a subsidiary by classifying the business as "insurance
business. '67 The distinction between insurance contract and insurance
business is important. While insurance companies have an exclusive power
to issue insurance contracts, they do not have a monopoly over insurance
business, although they may engage in that business. That business includes
broker dealer transactions, investment advisory services and many other
functions. Therefore, other entities may organize SPVs, buy and transfer
policies to them, and engage in sponsoring and distributing catastrophic
event bonds without encroaching on the exclusive territory of insurance
companies and running afoul of insurance laws.
The Model Act requires SPVs to organize as a corporation,
domiciled under state law. Corporate form, however, may present problems
under tax laws, as discussed above. SPVs will not be able to organize limited
partnerships or grantor trusts or other organizational forms that allow passthrough tax treatment. Congress has facilitated securitization of mortgages
by passing REMICs and securitization of other financial assets such as
receivables by FASIT. However, FASIT deals with SPVs organized as trusts
and not as corporations. Thus, the question of whether an SPV under the
Model Act is still feasible without congressional actions remains open, and
unless that issue is resolved, there is little use for the Model Act.
The Model Act has addressed the bankruptcy issue by providing that
the SPV enter into a reinsurance contract with the ceding insurance
company, thus insulating SPVs from insolvency of the ceding insurance
company, provided the SPV meets its obligations under the reinsurance
68
contract, under normal conditions

statement of law, however, is likely to shift some of the burden of proof in favor of
separate existence of insurance SPVs. The Rhode Island and Illinois Protected Cell
Acts do contain such provisions.
67 Most states have issued written interpretations of their statutes holding that
investors in disaster bonds and the SPVs are not "insurers" and need not be licensed
by the states as such. See Torchiana, supra note 4, at 671.
68 See Draft of SPRV Model Act (Nov. 1999). The reinsurance contract is
comparable to a special purpose vehicle contract that would be used in standard asset
securitization. The purpose of using a reinsurance contract is to clarify the intent that
state liquidation laws prevail over federal bankruptcy laws and that the relevant
contract and the SPRV are intended to be governed by state insurance laws. See
supra I.B (dealing with bankruptcy issues).
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CONCLUSION

The future of insurance (and generally, risk) securitization is quite
promising. So long as markets function, securitization makes sense.
Insurance risk securitization is less likely to fail, given the size of potential
catastrophe losses to the relative size of capital available in the securities
markets, and the insurance industry. As catastrophic event bonds become
more standardized, a public market is likely to develop, reducing transaction
costs. Insurance securitization has grown from one deal of $84 million in
1994 to 18 deals involving $2.5 billion in 1998.69 Operating enterprises that
are exposed to catastrophic event risks or other risks may expand insurance
securitization by issuing catastrophic event bonds directly to the capital
markets. These issues add depth and liquidity to the markets in such bonds.
Indeed, the first issue of a catastrophe bond by a non-insurer (Oriental Land
70
Company) took place last May.
Such direct issuances, however, will by-pass insurance companies
and reinsurers altogether, thus dramatically affecting the industry7' While in
the past, reinsurers have usually played the role of underwriters and ultimate
risk bearers for the industry, in the future, reinsurers will continue to use
their expertise to select portfolios of reinsurance contracts. However, they
will bear a lesser part of the risk directly, and distribute a higher proportion
of risk to the securities markets by buying and selling catastrophic event
bonds.
Securitization of catastrophic events risks may result in broader
coverage of the risks, and lower insurance costs. It may save taxpayers
money. If the net costs of insurance exceed the net benefits, bondholders will
limit their obligations to their investments and the premiums (unless
investors forego limited liability and agree to assessments). Policyholders
will also be covered by state insurance funds (in which the SPV must
participate). Further, the calculation of the contingent liabilities of the SPVs
and the reserves covering the liabilities should be regulated to prevent the
problems that insurance companies have faced in the past, when long-term
liabilities remained uncovered and reserves were spent on current
(sometimes extravagant) expenses. Who should regulate these functions,
See Alex Maurice, NAIC Poised to Adopt Securitization Models, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, July 12,
69

1999, at S28, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
See J. David Cummins, The Insurance Link To Securities, RISK MGMT., Aug. 1,
1999, at 17, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
71 Such a development is remindful of the effect of securitization on the banking
70

industry.
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however, is another issue. There is no reason why bank regulators should not
monitor the activities of banks in this area.
Risk securitization can radically alter risk management. If insurance
risks can be securitized so can other risks. So long as the markets function as
they should, and so long as investors are ready to bear risk for a return, risk
securitization may offer great benefits that can be shared among the many.
Innovative law making must address the attendant problems by
accommodating the issuers and other actors in the new process, and ensuring
investors' confidence. Most importantly, the problems and challenges that
new hybrid financial innovations pose can be addressed by analyzing the
existing laws as to their underlying policies and ensuring that the hybrids
meet the objectives of these policies.

